Translation of old economic doctrines into new technical frameworks led the profession to lose a valid theory of monetary non-neutrality. The theory relates to how additional money diffuses through the economy after entering at different points. Diffusion takes time, redistributes resources, and changes relative prices.
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The same theory of non-neutrality that I discuss here can also be traced back to Richard Cantillon (2010 [1755] ). Although Cantillon's work was published in 1755, which is three years after Hume's publication, Cantillon probably completed the manuscript around 1730 (Thornton 2007: 454) . There is no direct evidence proving an intellectual influence of Cantillon on Hume (Henderson 2010 : 163-166, Monroe 2001 [1923 ]: 211 n658, Murphy 1985 : 203, Perlman 1987 : 283-284 n5, Viner 1937 : 74 n2, Wennerlind 2005 . Still, a number of authors make unfounded suggestions of such influence (Blaug 1991 : ix, Hayek 1967 [1935 ]: 9, 1985 [1931 : 238, Rothbard 2006 [1995 ]: 360, Spengler 1954a and Thornton (2007) provides some indirect evidence. That Hume and Cantillon share the same theory of non-neutrality of money might also be explained by an independent factor that influenced both of them. Marget (1966a Marget ( [1938 Marget ( -1942 : 501-502, 1966b [1938-1942] : 309) proposes this explanation when he argues that the theory was the product not of an isolated individual, but of the intellectual debates of the time.
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affect relative prices through changes in the distributions of money supply of Hume's theory. Rather, relative prices in these models are affected in two other ways. First, a monetary shock changes relative prices through a version of "timedependent" staggered pricing decisions of Calvo (1983) , as is well illustrated by the recent contributions of Christiano et al. (2005) , Atkeson et al. (2010 ), Engel (2011 ), or Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011 . The second currently popular way of accounting for money non-neutrality and its effects on relative prices are "statedependent" pricing decisions of menu cost models, such as, Golosov and Lucas (2007) , Gertler and Leahy (2008) , Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) , or Midrigan (2011).
These time-dependent and state-dependent models, considered from a Humean perspective, do not substantially differ from each other. As I explain below in more detail, money itself is the main friction in Hume's theory and the conclusions follow with only a few additional assumptions. This contrasts with time-dependent and state-dependent models, which impose special assumptions on certain aspects of the world, with otherwise frictionless money. Thus, the center stage of inquiry in Hume's theory is occupied by frictions in money itself and by the pattern through which it changes in the economy. The main actors in time-dependent and state-dependent models, however, are frictions in particular markets and individuals.
The problem with these newer models is that they implicitly restrict scientific inquiry. Although they, like Hume's theory, describe step-by-step 6 changes in relative prices, the changes are exogenous: the monetary authority cannot cause changes in relative prices, although it does influence the price level; rather, the given landscape of markets and given knowledge of individuals determine relative-price changes. The time-dependent and state-dependent models thus restrict analysis in at least two ways. They discourage economists from asking how and why the monetary authority chooses the point where the new money is being injected. And they deter economists from investigating how monetary expansion changes relative prices.
The way in which contemporary economics shunted aside Hume's theory raises concerns about how it incorporates valid old theories into new frameworks.
Unfortunately, it seems that new frameworks are built for purposes that sometimes makes them incompatible with old ideas. Such incompatibility, as Blanchard (2003: 24) and Krugman (1984: 261-262) suggest, might tempt scholars to reject old ideas for reasons other than those of merit, such as convenience. If nothing else, we should be aware of the possibility of such rejections and understand how they happen. In the following sections, I use Lucas's discussion of Hume's theory in his Nobel Lecture (Lucas 1996) as a case study of how economists can reject valid older theory, like Hume's, when they examine it from perspective of a more recent technical framework of economic analysis.
I. Comparing Lucas and Hume: Is money an amplifier of external frictions

or is it a friction?
The misunderstanding between Lucas and Hume arises from their different views on the sources of the non-neutrality of money. The non-neutrality in Lucas (1996) arises from frictions of the world into which the monetary authority injects frictionless money. Such frictions include sticky and otherwise imperfect responses of people and markets to injections of money. In contrast, Hume emphasizes that money is itself characterized by inherent frictions that may lead to changes in the structure of the economy even without the frictions assumed by Lucas.
One can think of the economy in Lucas's model as a system of interconnected transparent tubes into which a blue liquid can be injected under pressure. In this analogy, the tubes represent the structure of the economy, the blue liquid represents money, and the observable movement of the liquid in otherwise colorless tubes represents the non-neutral effects of monetary change.
Depending on their volume, injections of the liquid change the color of the tubes.
However, while money matters in this model because it can change the color of the tubes, it does so in a constrained way. The consequences of a given change in the money supply is independent of the way in which this change happens-it is rather the structure of the economy embodied in the interconnections among the tubes that determines the effects of the change.
A slight modification to this model highlights the difference between Lucas and Hume. An injection of the blue liquid does not flow according to a pre- The contrast between the two models, and ultimately the contrast between Lucas and Hume, is not a mere quibble. Hume's theory describes how changes in the money supply change relative prices and in turn the structure of the economy. While a given monetary change does not predetermine the effects on prices of specific goods as these depend on how the change happens, the effects nonetheless exist as I pointed out in Introduction. A model with predetermined frictions like Lucas (1996) , in contrast, does not capture the openended relative-price effects of Hume's theory. Professional success of theoretical frameworks describing monetary non-neutrality in the spirit of Lucas (1996) thereby drives attention away from Hume's theory and its unique insights.
II. Hume on the Dispersion of Money
Let me first consider in more detail Hume's framework, as laid out in "Of Money" (1987a Money" ( [1752 ), "Of Interest" (1987b [1752] ), and "Of the Balance of Trade" (1987c [1752] 
II.1 Money enters the economy through a specific point of injection
For Hume, money enters the economy through the money balances of a specific segment of a heterogeneous population. This implies that some receive the new money first and some receive it later. If the money is imported, the importers receive it first; if it comes from debasement of coins or printing of cash, the first spenders, likely in the government, receive it first, and so on. Hume also touches on paper money (1987c [1752] : 317 n13). He says the consequences of an increase in the quantity of paper money can increase output, just as when new money enters through importing specie. Since Hume's previous discussion of such a beneficial impact also assumes a point injection of the new money, one can infer that Hume thinks that when there is an increase in paper money, it disperses through the money balances of particular people.
Hume is thus consistent on the consequences of changes in the money supply from different sources, which suggests that his view on the transmission of changes in the money supply is consistent as well. Changes in the money supply, according to Hume, therefore work through changes of the money balances of specific individuals rather than through proportional changes of the 11 money balances of all people.
II.2 It takes time before new money reaches its equilibrium distribution
The second part of Hume's theory describes how new money diffuses throughout the economy. New money spreads across the money balances of all people only gradually. As Hume says:
[S]ome time is required before the [new] money circulates through the whole state, and makes its effect be felt on all ranks of people[.] (Hume 1987a : 286; see also Hume 1987b : 305)
Hume describes how merchants imported gold and silver from the Spanish port of Cadiz:
Here are a set of manufacturers or merchants, we shall suppose, who have received returns of gold and silver for goods which they sent to CADIZ. They are thereby enabled to employ more workmen referring to changes in output and relative prices, which I did on purpose because changes in output are not the focus of the present paper and I discuss changes in relative prices later.
equilibrium because newly injected money has to go through a number of transactions to reach the final equilibrium distribution. However, since the same piece of money cannot be simultaneously spent and received in two different transactions and two transactions using the same piece of money can therefore happen only in sequential order, it will take more than one transaction for the final equilibrium to be established. The flows of expenditures and distribution of money balances of final equilibrium therefore does not happen at the moment of the change in the money supply; it happens only with passage of time.
II.3 The injection of new money is followed by changes in relative prices
The assumptions that new money enters the economy through particular individuals' money balances and that new money changes the relative expenditures in the economy imply that an increase in the money supply changes relative prices of goods, at least temporarily. Hume describes how relative prices change step by step and reflect the sequential diffusion of new money throughout the economy:
[T]hough the high price of commodities … [is] a necessary consequence of the encrease of gold and silver, yet it follows not immediately upon that encrease; but some time is required before the money circulates through the whole state, and makes its effect be felt on all ranks of people. At first, no alteration is perceived; by degrees the price rises, first of one commodity, then of another; till 14 the whole at last reaches a just proportion with the new quantity of specie which is in the kingdom. (Hume 1987a : 286; see also Hume 1987a Hume [1972 1987b [1972 : 296, 305-306)
One might object that Hume's theory rests on additional, hidden assumptions.
For example, just as I discuss later with respect to Lucas (1996) , perhaps Hume implicitly assumes imperfect market-clearing, imperfect information, or a type of imperfect expectations. These additional assumptions might serve as a good complement to the theory. However, under plausible circumstances, they are unnecessary.
To prove this, I introduce a frictionless environment (1) While the present value at time 0 is $1 for merchants, it is only $1/(1+r 1 ) for workers, and $1/(1+r 2 ) for farmers, where 1>1/(1+r 1 )>1/(1+r 2 ). The difference in the present values means that in spite of perfect foresight, the three groups of people experience a change in their relative permanent incomes, which means they tend to respond differentially to the monetary shock at time 0. The monetary shock increases the ability of merchants to outbid workers and farmers. For the same reason, the ability of workers to outdo farmers in bidding for goods increases as well. The change in relative willingness to pay for different goods also implies a change in relative demands for these goods and a corresponding 16 change in relative prices.
One can object that while the unexpected monetary expansion might lead to an immediate change in relative prices, the economy also immediately moves to its new final equilibrium. Such an immediate movement would mean that the step-by-step changes in relative prices described by Hume would not happen.
The first such objection is that people who receive new money later, like workers and farmers in the example above, can take into account their higher future if the short-run and long-run supply curves were identical. Without these special assumptions, reaching the relative prices of the new final equilibrium has to take time and is accompanied by changes in relative demands for goods across the economy and by the changes in relative prices described by Hume.
As for the second objection, wherein sellers arbitrage between lower present prices and higher future prices, this does not imply that prices of all goods have to immediately reach their final equilibrium levels either. Even if the storage costs of goods were zero and all goods and services were storable, some sellers would still have an incentive to abstain from restricting supply and increasing present prices to their final equilibrium levels. The discount factor that sellers use to compute the present value of their future revenues is higher than zero and therefore allows sellers to charge lower prices at the moment of monetary expansion when compared to prices in the final equilibrium. Moreover, 
III. Lucas on Hume and Money
Hume's theory of monetary non-neutrality is powerful because its conclusions depend on only two, rather reasonable, assumptions: that money is injected into the economy through money balances of particular individuals, and that initial recipients of new money change the pattern of relative expenditures in the economy. These assumptions are sufficient for us to conclude that a change in the money supply affects relative prices, and correspondingly, production decisions and the distribution of resources. As I have already pointed out, the theory is also consistent with empirical evidence; this, however, did not prevent it from disappearing from the main discussions in economics.
I use Lucas (1996) as a case study to help unveil the cause of the disappearance. Rather than resulting from a difference in the underlying economic way of thinking between Hume and Lucas, Hume's theory might have disappeared because economists have relied on technical frameworks that have restricted economic theorizing with an overly restrictive analytical structure.
I build the argument in two steps, where I first focus on Lucas's own perception of the difference between himself and Hume and I show that Hume's theory does not have to be viewed in the light of omission of the equilibrium style of analysis. I then point out that the main cause of the disagreement is more likely a matter of technique rather than that of economics.
III.1 Hume and Lucas may be representatives of different methodologies
20 Lucas (1996) sees his way of thinking as fundamentally different from that of Hume-although he recognizes Hume as an intellectual predecessor of his own views on monetary non-neutrality. 5 Reviewing Hume's (1987ab [1752 )
conclusions, however, Lucas expresses disagreement, which Blaug (2001: 154-155 ) has discussed and Laidler (2010: 48 n13) noted.
Blaug (2001) argues that the source of Lucas's (1996) disagreement with
Hume is a clash of methodologies that cannot be reconciled within a unified framework. From this perspective, Hume explains the non-neutrality of money through disequilibrium reasoning while Lucas struggles to reconstruct Hume's explanation within a general equilibrium framework. Hume's account of short-run non-neutrality, however, cannot be reconstructed in a general equilibrium model and Lucas is unsuccessful. Lucas's (1996) own assessment of his unsuccessful struggle is similar to Blaug's (2001 Ball and Mankiw (1994) , to which Lucas responded in 1994. Ball and Mankiw (1994) make a distinction between "traditionalists" and "heretics" in macroeconomics (1994: 127-128) , where traditionalists believe in the importance of price-stickiness and heretics do not. While Ball and Mankiw decide to include Friedman and Hume (1994: 127) among the "traditionalists", they put Lucas into the category of "heretics" (1994: 135). Lucas (1994: 154) in his response labels Ball and Mankiw's (1994) distinction as "ideological" and he considers the use of this type of ideology in economics to be "risky" (1994: 154-155 ). An ideologue, according to Lucas, has an incentive to caricature one's opponents and to abstain from acknowledging contributions from the other side of the barricade just for the sake of ideological purity. In light of this debate, Lucas might have chosen Hume as the subject of his Nobel lecture to prove that the ideological lines drawn by Ball and Mankiw (1994) are not very useful because of important overlaps between traditionalists and heretics: while Ball and Mankiw (1994) view Hume as traditionalist, Lucas shows that Hume still has some important insights as a heretic.
to "resort to disequilibrium dynamics" (Lucas 1996: 669) , which is a different and inferior methodological position compared to Lucas's. Hume and his followers use the disequilibrium style of theorizing "only because the analytical equipment available to them offers no alternative" (Lucas 1996: 669) . Lucas later gives a more comprehensive statement:
The intelligence of these attempts to deal theoretically with the real effects of changes in money is still impressive to the modern reader, but serves only to underscore the futility of attempting to talk through hard dynamic problems without any of the equipment of modern mathematical economics. (Lucas 1996: 669) Although Blaug (2001) and Lucas's (1996) It is true that both Hume (Hume 1987ab [1752 ) and Lucas (1996) also explore the link between the theory and changes in aggregate output in some specific direction but this is a separate problem that, as noted, I do not intend to discuss.
proportion to the increase in money, what force stops this from happening right away? Are people committed, perhaps even contractually, to continue to offer goods at the old prices for a time?
If so, Hume does not mention it. Are sellers ignorant of the fact that money has increased and a general inflation is inevitable? But
Hume claims that the real consequences of money changes are "easy to trace" and "easily foreseen." If so, why do these consequences occur at all? (Lucas 1996: 663-664) This shows Meanwhile, sellers, responding to demand, will not immediately set equilibrium prices either. While customers of some sellers increase their money balances relatively sooner, the balances of other sellers' customers may remain unchanged for some time. Sellers catering to the customers with higher money balances thus can increase prices above their final equilibrium levels and sellers whose primary customers are the later recipients of the new money might find that the optimal solution is not to immediately raise their prices to the final equilibrium.
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The essence of Hume's theory of the non-neutrality of money is therefore not in conflict with the equilibrium style of reasoning. Hume's theory can be conveyed, as I have done above, in a framework with fully rational sellers and buyers who use money in an otherwise frictionless world. Prices do not have to reach their final equilibrium immediately after the new money enters the economy. Every step of the progression toward the final equilibrium, however, is an equilibrium itself, because people under given circumstances make the best choices they possibly can.
The distinction between Hume and Lucas therefore does not have to be seen as between equilibrium and disequilibrium, or between rigorous analysis and "patched-in" dynamics, as Lucas puts the issue at one point (Lucas 1996: 669) . The underlying analytical tool in both cases is a framework of general equilibrium and the real difference between them comes with their different understandings of the non-neutrality of money. While Hume sees non-neutrality primarily in the diffusion of money across the economy, Lucas points to the nonneutral features of the world into which we inject otherwise neutral money.
My analysis does not imply that one of the two views on the sources of non-neutrality of money is necessarily wrong. Quite the contrary: each of the two views might be correct. However, the profession's interest in views of monetary non-neutrality like Lucas's (1996) has led them to build technical frameworks of analysis, such as those using models with menu costs or staggered prices, that decrease our ability to discuss Hume's theory, even though the theory is just as 25 compatible with equilibrium theorizing.
IV. Conclusion
Because of its excessive interest in models like Lucas's (1996) , then, modern economics has overly discounted an aspect of non-neutrality of money represented here by David Hume, in which the source of monetary non-neutrality is the money itself rather than various frictions of the world into which otherwise frictionless money is injected.
The neglect of Hume's insights follows from the nature of economic science. Most of the insights in economics are not based on experiments, but are established by deductive reasoning (Hayek 1999 (Hayek [1944 : 136-137). With every new generation of economists, the knowledge of previous generations is sustained only when it is successfully replicated. But the very need for this replication opens the possibility of losing valuable insights. And methodological trends sometimes make it difficult to rediscover some theorems, as Hayek (1944: 137) points out and as Krugman (1984: 261-2) illustrates regarding the role of money in international economics. The story I have just presented is therefore not only about bringing back a theory that is logically consistent and empirically relevant. It also speaks to the importance of the history of economic thought as a tool for economic research.
The value of research in the history of thought stands out when one looks at the tension between Stigler (1969) and Boulding (1971) , as Boettke (2000) 26 points out. Stigler argues that although economics has a useful past, the costs of researching the history of economic thought surpass the benefits. The benefits of revisiting past authors are low because their useful ideas are already incorporated within modern economic thought. After claiming that researching the history of economic thought is too costly, Stigler concludes by saying "it remains the unfulfilled task of the historians of economics to show that their subject is worth its cost" (Stigler 1969: 230 
